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ABSTRACT
This paper is designed to examine the role non-governmental organizations (NGOs) play in politics. 
Previous evidence suggests NGOs mobilize communities to challenge existing patterns of authority 
or that they serve hand-in-glove with existing elites.  We reconcile these two contradictory findings 
by identifying an important contextual feature that helps determine the extent NGOs mobilize or 
anesthetize.  We argue a community’s level of education influences not only whether people vote but 
how they vote.  We employ a cross-sectional data set from Brazilian municipalities that allows us to 
estimate the relationship between NGOs, voting turnout, and electoral results.  We find that 
although there is a significant statistical interaction between literacy and NGOs when explaining 
voting turnout, the effect is not substantively important.  The interaction between literacy and 
NGOs is, however, an important consideration in determining how people vote: in communities 
with relatively low literacy rates, a robust NGO presence significantly increases the left’s electoral 
fortunes.  Our findings imply the influence NGOs have on society is more political than social.
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INTRODUCTION
Are non-governmental organizations (NGOs) neutral arbiters, facilitating the development of social 
capital and civil society without favoring one political persuasion over another?  Or, do NGOs carry 
with them an ideological baggage that influences how their constituency votes?  These questions are 
growing in importance since NGOs have become a significant presence in the developing world. 
Whether responding to natural disasters or providing technical training in agriculture, NGOs are 
increasingly relied on for a wide variety of services.  Citing figures from the Union of International 
Associations, Davies notes that from 1854 to 2007, the number of International Non-governmental 
Organizations (INGOs) increased from six to over 60,000 (Davies 2008).  The numerical 
proliferation at the local level has also been important.  In terms of aid, $3.5 billion was channeled 
through NGOs in Africa at the end of the 1990s which represents just under 20 percent of total aid 
to the continent (Chege 1999, cited in Hearn 2007; p. 1096). In some countries NGOs are proving 
services to more than a third of citiens  (Devine 2006 ; p. 79-80).  This “third sector” represents an 
important alternative or compliment to both government and existing societal institutions.  
  But more than just service providers, the arrival of NGOs may spark political change. 
NGOs may compete with governments, may weaken clientelistic relations by providing alternative 
sources for public goods, may have transformative effects on members through the formation of 
social capital--or they may merely reinforce the status quo through their co-optation or capture by 
existing elites. Recent scholarship suggest that NGOs can have all these effects--and more--with a 
vague assertion that the specific nature of any NGOs impact is a function of context. (Clarke 1998; 
Mercer 2002).
 In this paper, we examine the political consequences of NGO activity, focusing on citizens’ 
attitudes and behavior. We focus on three questions: First, does participation in NGOs empower 
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citizens and encourage engagement more broadly? For this question we focus more specifically on 
whether NGOs increase or decrease turnout in their communities. Second, do NGOs transform 
political attitudes and voting behavior, or do they strengthen the positions of existing elites? To 
answer this second question we focus on the impact NGO activity has on voting behavior. Third, do 
these effects vary with context? In particular, we examine NGOs’ impact where levels of human 
capital vary.
 Using a sub-national data set on NGOs in Brazil, we examine the political effects of NGOs. 
We measure the impact of NGOs on turnout and support for leftist parties, and test for interactions 
with levels of human capital (literacy). We find that in municipalities with relatively low  levels of 
education, NGOs have a positive effect on turnout and the percentage of the population supporting 
leftist candidates.  In relatively more educated populations, NGOs have little impact on 
participation.  Although statistically significant, one can question their substantive importance when 
explaining turnout;  In terms of substantive importance, NGOs matter when explaining voting 
behavior.  In communities where literacy is relatively low, a growing NGO presence is associated 
with significant gains by the left.   While NGOs in relatively uneducated communities are statistically 
associated with higher voting turnout (something we often associate with social capital and civil 
society), their more tangible influence is political.
 The paper proceeds as follows.  In section one, we describe the current literature on NGOs 
and the questions that remain unanswered.  From those questions we derive several hypotheses.  In 
section two, we introduce the data and model.  In section three we report the results.  In section 
four, we discuss the stability of the results and offer several possible explanations.  In the 
conclusion, we highlight the limitations of  our study and its implications.
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PREVIOUS WORK
The literature on NGOs and their impact on policies and outcomes as diverse as health, education, 
poverty, hunger, and disaster relief is both descriptively rich and voluminous.    Despite the volume, 
the relative number of articles and books on the direct political consequences of NGOs is small. 
One theme that stands out, however, is the diversity of conclusions reached regarding the impact of 
NGOs on politics. Broadly, the literature can be classified into scholarship that sees NGOs as agents 
for political mobilization and change, and scholarship concluding that NGOs merely strengthen the 
status quo. 
 One set of findings emphasize the principal agent relationship between NGOs and their 
patrons, suggesting NGOs discourage political change. Broadly, this literature argues NGOs limit 
their scope of activities to those favored by donors, and that these limits are most constraining when 
the primary client or donor is government.  For example, Anthony Bebbington, a long-time 
observer of NGO activity, has consistently voiced concerns over whether NGOs serve the 
population specified in their mission statements or the donors who financially back their efforts.  As 
early as 1993 in an edited volume with John Farrington, the two authors question whether NGOs 
answer the call of their intended beneficiaries or instead represent the concerns of their donors or 
urban-based elites (Bebbington and Farrington 1993).  In later work, Bebbington observed a secular 
trend in which NGOs involved with poverty alleviation progressed through an evolution that has 
gravitated away from political action.  According to Bebbington, there has been a “certain 
depoliticization of poverty, in which poverty discussions are increasingly separated from questions 
of distribution and social transformation...”(Bebbington 2005; p. 706).  Many case studies reach 
similar conclusions. Surveying activity in Brazil, Garrison (2000) finds that as NGOs evolve, they 
bring with them a more technocratic discourse that serves to legitimize the neoliberal Brazilian state. 
Gray finds that NGOs in Vietnam have functioned more like government sub-contractors whose 
motives and methods are not all that distinct from the state (Gray 1999). 
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 An equally compelling literature reaches the opposite conclusion: NGOs are agents of 
political mobilization and change. Early studies on NGOs and democratization represents the bulk 
of work extolling the virtues of NGOs and how they raised the level of civil society to challenge 
authoritarian regimes (Hojman 1993; Diamond 1994; Lambrou 1997; Silliman and Noble 1998).  A 
key component of this work is the conceptualization of NGOs as mobilizers of previously excluded 
groups. NGOs were seen as important actors in expanding the number of voices and interests in the 
process of democratization, organizing pro-democracy interests that had not yet been heard: 
students, women’s groups, farmers, unions, religious groups, the media, and human rights 
organizations (Diamond 1994).  Even after the initial transfer of power from military to civilian rule 
had been accomplished, these new groups continued to fulfill important roles in the new 
democracies (Lambrou 1997).  Much of the work pointing to the impact NGOs had on 
democratization came from first-hand observations of the democratization process and the role 
these organizations played in it.   This literature has earned more recent support in quantitative 
studies which find a direct connection between increased NGO activity and political change (Brown, 
Brown et al. 2002; Brown and Desposato… 2007; Brown, Brown et al. 2008; Boulding… 2009; 
Boulding 2010). 
 The tension in this growing literature suggests a need for macro variables that explain the 
differential impacts of NGOs. Two important steps in this direction were Gerarde Clarke’s article in 
Political Studies in 1998 and Claire Mercer’s 2002 article in Progress in Development Studies.  Both articles 
explain why little systematic research exists on NGOs and why the results so far have been 
inconclusive.  
 In 1998, Clarke recognized an important feature of the NGO literature that militated against 
frank assessments of their political effects: much of the actual literature was produced by activist 
and others who held important stakes in NGO success.  Despite that initial impediment, by 1998 a 
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number of articles and books began to emerge, providing more honest assessments of NGO 
activity.  Clarke noted two divergent sets of findings in this literature, one de Tocquevillian and one 
Gramscian.  In the Tocquevillian tradition, significant groups of observers argued NGO activity 
strengthened civil society and democracy itself by providing avenues through which formerly 
unorganized interests could express themselves (Clarke 1998; p.85).  Those Clarke termed 
Gramscians found that NGO activity takes what were nascent, grass-roots movements and 
institutionalizes them in ways that diminish the extent to which they challenge the state (Clarke 1998; 
p. 86).  In the end, Clarke argues that there is significant empirical evidence for both perspectives--
NGOs may mobilize or demoblize, inspire change or stabilize the status quo--and the determining 
factor is context. Clarke offers no guidance, however, as to what might define different contexts. 
While he alludes to why we find a growing civil society in some contexts and decline in others, there 
is relatively little to go on in terms of  testable hypotheses.
 Four years later, Mercer too recognized the overt normative bias that pervades much of the 
work on NGOs and politics.  For Mercer, the problem is the overly optimistic view that NGOs will 
help democracy.  In addition to their liberal bias, Mercer points out the work suffers from a fair 
amount of ethnocentrism, arguing that developing societies must overcome their current societal 
norms to foster the kind of civil societies that will engender democracy (Mercer 2002; p.11). 
Finding most of the work that extols the virtues of NGOs as conduits through which democratic 
societies can be formed to be dubious, Mercer argues for a ‘contextualized approach’ which 
recognizes that NGOs form very complex relationships with society.  And, in order to understand 
their impact, the wider social, economic, political, and cultural contexts require our full attention 
(Mercer 2002; p. 11-13).  
 Our reading of the existing literature comes to roughly the same conclusions.  First, given 
that NGOs are often supposed to be apolitical in their orientations, it is difficult to find work that 
systematically attempts to examine whether they influence politics.  Second, and more importantly 
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for our purposes here, we agree that the impact NGOs have on politics is very much a product of 
the context within which they are inserted.  Work following Mercer’s review seems to prove her 
point: whether NGOs promote political participation, democracy, or political change--more broadly 
defined--depends on where the NGOs are located.
 The current challenge is to begin assessing their conclusions--do NGOs have differential 
impacts as a function of context, and can we identify macro variables that affect the nature and 
magnitude of these impacts? In the next section, we argue that education as measured by literacy 
plays a key role in this intermediation, offering several hypotheses about the relationship.
NGOs, Education, and Politics
We propose examining the relationship between NGO activity and politics along a dimension we 
argue should matter most: education.  Specifically, we want to know whether the relationship 
between NGO activity and politics varies between municipalities that are illiterate and highly 
educated.  Toward that end, we use sub-national level data from Brazil in order to hold important 
country characteristics constant.  By focusing on Brazil’s 5,000 plus municipalities (counties), we can 
vary the levels of education in order to help identify whether a municipality’s level of education 
translates NGO activity into political change.  Before proceeding to the data, let us describe why we 
chose  education.
 Education levels can influence the relationship between NGOs and politics in a number of 
different ways.  The causal mechanisms we identify here are not exhaustive, they merely represent a 
starting point.  First, NGOs and education can act as functional equivalents, when one is absent the 
other helps mobilize communities.  Second, education can act as an amplifier, increasing NGO 
influence on political participation.   Finally, to the extent that education increases knowing one’s 
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rights as a citizen, education is crucial to breaking the bonds of clientelism.  The ability to read and 
write represents an important set of  tools citizens employ to exercise political autonomy.  
 Education and NGOs as functional equivalents.  NGOs are often designed to help organize 
groups of people who normally don’t interact on a regular basis.  Whether it is farmers who have to 
travel considerable distances to meet with other farmers, or an association that organizes women to 
discuss issues on infant care and related health issues, in the most successful cases NGOs bring 
people together in ways that permit increased communication and cooperation.  Often, NGOs are 
designed or created for the expressed purpose of organizing individuals who have previously been 
disorganized: the poor, the illiterate, etc.  Those with the means and ability to organize themselves, 
those with relatively high levels of human capital (education), may rely less on non-governmental 
activity to participate in politics.  If education and NGO activity act as equivalents, we would expect 
to observe a strong relationship between NGOs and turnout in the least educated municipalities, but 
not where the average level of  education is relatively high.  
 Does the same change described above with respect to turnout influence who wins and 
looses?  Here we are on less solid theoretical and empirical ground.  A more informed, organized, or 
autonomous electorate will not necessarily favor one side of the political spectrum over the other. 
It’s also not clear whether NGOs operate as neutral arbiters or ideologically biased political actors. 
Since in this national sample we cannot delineate which organizations might lean to the left or even 
involve themselves in politics, we are agnostic about the outcome.  While one might be tempted to 
equate political mobilization (turnout) with voting for the left, the two are not the same.  With those 
caveats in mind, we test whether the same mechanisms outlined above might influence the electoral 
success of the left; We want to establish whether there is an empirical relationship between NGOs 
and the left.  Moreover, we want to know whether context influences their association.
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Hypothesis 1: NGOs and education are functional equivalents in terms of their relationship with turnout 
 and voting behavior.
 Education amplifies NGO influence.  Education, though not a necessary nor sufficient condition 
for effective participation in politics, is often conceptualized as an important component that helps 
determine an individual’s level of social capital (Paxton 1999).  Work by economists in the field of 
endogenous growth theory emphasizes how the overall level of human capital can have important 
spillover effects on each individual’s ability and accomplishments (Lucas 1988; Romer 1989; Lucas 
1990).  The reasoning here is simple, in contexts with high levels of social capital, NGOs can be 
more effective and efficient.  Where the population is less adept at communicating, organizing, and 
participating, NGOs will have a more difficult time in mobilizing their constituents.  
 Education can also increase the influence NGOs have on politics through its impact on 
clientelism.  An educated populace is less inclined to rely on clientelistic arrangements to express 
itself politically.  Armed with the ability to read, for example, citizens can effectively navigate 
government bureaucracy without relying on others who demand payment or political allegiance. 
Given that clientelism is defined as the exchange of goods and services between two unequal parties, 
a lack of education could mean an individual is more likely to rely on such forms of clientelistic 
exchange.  Literate individuals are able to acquire information on politics in a number of different 
venues; they are not wholly reliant on radio, television, or more educated citizens to provide 
important information.  Armed with that information, they are more likely to exercise independent 
political choices.  In addition to breaking the bonds of clientelism, a higher level of education can 
also increase one’s sense of internal political efficacy, increasing the probability of political 
participation (Almond and Verba 1963; Scoble 1968; Olsen 1972).  
 Again, we want to reiterate that increasing social capital or eliminating clientelism does not 
automatically lead voters to favor the left; We simply want to know whether NGOs are associated 
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with mobilization (turnout) or with changes in political attitudes and voting behavior.  With the 
same caveats, we generate the following hypothesis:
 Hypothesis 2: Education amplifies the influence of  NGO activity on turnout and voting behavior.
METHODS AND ANALYSIS
Data
The two dependent variables we employ to evaluate our hypotheses are turnout (ballots cast as a 
percentage of the voting age population) and the share of the vote won by the Worker’s Party (PT; 
Partido dos Trabahladores).  The voting data we obtained comes from IPEA’s website (IPEA 2011). 
Although voting is mandatory in Brazil, Table 1 indicates that not all municipalities participate fully. 
For example, in the 2006 presidential race, roughly 74 percentage of the population cast valid 
ballots.  This figure ranges from 45 percent to 89 percent at the municipal level.  In terms of the 
PT’s share of the vote, in 2006 Lula--the PT’s incumbent presidential candidate--averaged 53 percent 
of the vote across all municipalities, a figure that ranged from 17 to 95 percent.  Figures on turnout 
and the PT’s share of the vote were obtained from IPEA (Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada).  In 
addition to data on voting and turnout, we obtained data on the number of NGOs in each 
municipality taken from a survey conducted in 2005 (IBGE).  The survey was conducted by Brazil’s 
state statistical agency (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística; IBGE).  Control variables were 
obtained from IBGE and IPEA respectively.  
Table 1 about here
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Methods
Given the cross-sectional nature of the data, we use the 2005 data on NGOs to predict the level of 
turnout and the PT’s success in 2006.  We use Ordinary Least Squares with state fixed effects in 
order to account for the significant heterogeneity that exists between Brazil’s different regions. 
Including state fixed effects also allows us to control for candidate effects that no doubt characterize 
the different state races that we include in our analysis.1  
 Our variable of interest is the number of NGOs within a municipality per 1,000 residents. 
The kinds of NGOs included in the survey differ dramatically: they range from social and religious 
organizations to groups dedicated to specific activities in the fields of education or health.  While 
disaggregating the number of NGOs into what would be roughly 15 different groups would be a 
logical approach, the hypotheses tested in this paper should pertain to all the different kinds of 
NGOs found in the data.  Moreover, different classification schemes along different dimensions 
requires considerable thought, theoretical justification, and additional statistical analysis.  Given the 
space constraints of journal contributions, we decided to focus here specifically on the results 
generated by the aggregate measure of NGOs.  In order to meet the assumptions made by Ordinary 
Least Squares estimation, we logged the number of NGOs per 1,000 residents because of its highly 
skewed nature.  In addition to the variable of interest, we include a number of other independent 
variables as controls.
 Income.  Turnout and voting behavior (voting on left-right issues) are often associated with 
income (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980).  This is especially true in the 2006 election in which Lula did 
very well in the poorest municipalities, a significant shift from the broader base of support he 
enjoyed in the 2002 elections.  A wealthier community is likely to enjoy higher levels of political 
efficacy which could influence turnout.  
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1 For example, one state might have a close race between two attractive candidate for governor, raising turnout in every 
municipality in that state, while voters in another state might be dissatisfied with their options and again, be more likely 
to stay home in every municipality.
 Inequality.  Where incomes are highly unequal, communities may represent an important 
breeding ground for discontent.  Inequality throws in stark relief the important differences between 
rich and poor, providing fertile ground for political mobilization.  At the same time, there are 
reasons to expect inequality could have the opposite impact.  To the degree that in unequal contexts 
politics is purely an affair of the elite, we might expect lower turnout and a more conservative brand 
of politics.  We remain agnostic to either theory, yet include inequality in the equation as a control 
variable. 
 Urbanization.  We include urbanization in the model since there are a number of reasons to 
expect that the rural-urban context can have an important impact on the decision to vote as well as 
for whom?  From early literary classics written by Jorge Amado (1974), to modern day ethnographic 
studies by Robert Gay (Gay 1990), we know  that clientelism can exist in the city and in the 
countryside.  What we don’t know is where it is most prevalent.  Theories associated with 
modernization indicate that once workers leave the countryside in search of wage labor in the city, 
the degree of control political elites hold on the masses declines.  Gay’s work in the favelas of Rio 
indicates otherwise (Gay 1990).  Consequently, urbanization may or may not track the degree of 
clientelism prevalent in the community.  
 Population.  The political life of the small town versus the big city is likely to present different 
constraints and opportunities for politicians as they attempt to mobilize society.  Rather than relying 
on commercial media, people living in small towns often rely on word-of-mouth to transmit 
important news.  The difference in how people communicate in large cities versus small towns surely 
influences turnout and voting behavior.  We account for whether the size of the population 
influences both turnout and the choices made by the electorate.
 Migration.  Previous work suggests the Left has polled less well in communities characterized 
by large migrant populations (Ames 1994).  Without past ties to the community, voters lack the cues 
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necessary to make informed choices, forcing them to rely on patronage politics.  The Left usually 
relies on community organization relative to other parties that focus on patronage strategies.  
 The regressions reported in the next section estimate the correlation between NGOs and 
turnout in the 2006 elections at 5 different levels (state deputy, federal deputy, federal senator, 
governor, and president).  The same model is used to estimate the relationship between NGOs and 
the PT’s share of  the vote at the same 5 levels.  We employ the following regression model:
 
(1) Turnout or PT Share2006 = a + b1(NGOs per 1,000 Residents2005 (logged)) + b2(Literacy2000) + 
b3(Urbanization2000) + b4(Migrants2000) + b5(Population2000) + b6(Income per capita2000)  + 
b7(State Dummies) + e.
To determine whether context matters in terms of education, we estimate the model above with the 
interaction between NGOs and literacy added:
(2) Turnout or PT Share2006 = a + b1(NGOs per 1,000 Residents2005) + b2(Literacy2000) + b3(NGOs 
X Literacy) + b4(Urbanization2000) + b5(Migrants2000) + b6(Population2000) + b7(Income 
per capita2000) + b8(State Dummies) + e.
Equation (2) provides a direct evaluation of our two hypotheses.  If the coefficient on the 
interactive term is insignificant, educational context does not matter with respect to NGOs and their 
correlation with political participation and voting behavior.  If the coefficient on the interactive term 
is negative and statistically significant, NGOs operating in less educated municipalities have a more 
positive effect than do their counterparts in more educated municipalities.  This would suggest 
NGOs work as substitutes for education in terms of turnout and voting behavior.  If the coefficient 
for the interactive term is positive and statistically significant, it suggests that education enhances 
NGO activity.  
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 The empirical strategy outlined above is limited to the extent it does not account for 
endogeneity.  In the context of our study, municipalities with high levels of turnout and a preference 
for leftist candidates may encourage the creation and placement of NGOs.  Although entirely 
possible, the correlation between literacy, turnout, and NGOs is quite low, leading us to believe that 
the impact of endogeneity on our estimates is weak.  The pearson’s r correlation between literacy 
and NGOs is .28 and between turnout (Presidential ’06) and NGOs is .30.   Ideally, we would 
employ an appropriate instrumental variable. Finding a variable that affects the number of NGOs in 
each municipality but not turnout or votes for leftist candidates is no easy task; we have not found 
one at this writing. Since no variable with these properties exists to our knowledge, we are somewhat 
limited in the claims we can make.  Fortunately, there is an alternative to the instrumental variable 
solution: propensity score matching.  
 The idea behind matching is to generate a sample of cases that more closely approximate the 
kind one would see in a blocked or even randomized experiment.    Matching routines abound and 
are available in a number of different statistical software programs.    We chose to use the approach 
suggested by Alexis Diamond and Jasjeet Sekhon which employs a fairly robust algorithm to match 
cases: genetic matching (Diamond and Sekhon 2005).  One requirement of using the matching 
technique is that the treatment variable must be dichotomous.  In our study, the treatment variable is 
not dichotomous: the number of NGOs weighted by population (logged).  To test the stability of 
the results with respect to claims about endogeneity, we split the NGO variable into a dichotomous 
one by designating cases below the mean as zero and those above the mean as one.  While not an 
ideal solution, it allows us to check whether the kind of assumptions we are making in the OLS 
framework are responsible for generating the results we observe.  We examine our main regression 
results in this matching framework to check whether our foundational results hold: the regression 
model that predicts the percentage of the vote won by the PT presidential candidate (includes the 
interaction between NGOs and literacy).  As can be observed in Appendix I, our results hold, 
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providing at least some preliminary indication that our estimates are robust to the assumptions we 
make regarding endogeneity.  Having shown that our results are robust to matching techniques, 
while giving us more confidence in our results, does not absolve us from the usual disclaimers about 
causality, selection, and the limits this places on our study.
RESULTS
Tables 2 - 5 report the OLS results for the 2006 elections at five different levels: state deputy, federal 
deputy, senator, governor, and president, show strong NGO effects on political behavior.  First, 
when considering the direct impact of NGO presence on turnout, the estimates indicate there is no 
relationship in all but one race: in 2006, there is no correlation between NGOs and Turnout (Table 
2).  All of the other variables are strongly correlated with turnout in the expected direction.  Literacy 
and income both have a very positive and strongly significant correlation with turnout across all 
types of  elections.  Inequality has a negative relationship which is statistically significant.
Table 2 about here
 However, once we include an interactive term, there is a strong and significant relationship 
between NGO presence and turnout. The coefficient on the interactive term is negative and 
statistically significant, implying that turnout is much more sensitive to NGO activity in 
communities where literacy is relatively low.  Because the interaction is between two continuous 
variables, a further step is required to understand their substantive impact.  To evaluate the 
importance of NGOs and context, we generated predicted values for turnout when literacy is at its 
minimum, median, and maximum and when NGOs were at the 5%, 25%, 50%, 75%, and 95% 
percentiles (holding all other variables constant at their means).  This exercise was performed for the 
presidential race where we expected to see the greatest effect.  The impact NGOs have on turnout is 
substantively small.  When varying NGOs from the 5th percentile to the 95th percentile in relatively 
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uneducated communities (literacy at its minimum), turnout increases by only about 2 percentage 
points.  
Table 3 about here
 Table 4 reports results for voting behavior from regressions estimating the relationship 
between NGOs and the PT’s vote share in five different races in 2006.  Unlike Table 2 which 
showed relatively little correlation between NGOs and turnout (except for the gubernatorial races), 
we find NGOs had an extremely positive and statistically significant correlation with the PT’s 
success.  For each ten-fold increase in NGOs per 1,000 population (e.g., going from 1 NGO to 10 
NGOs per 1,000 residents), the coefficient implies the PT’s chances increase by roughly one percent 
age point (the coefficient is .95) in the presidential election.  
 In Table 5, we estimate the same models with the addition of the interactive term between 
literacy and NGO activity.  The coefficient on the interactive term between literacy and NGOs is 
negative and statistically significant.  The significantly negative coefficient implies that as both 
literacy and NGOs increase, the PT’s success is less sensitive to increases in NGO numbers.  Again, 
to understand the substantive significance of the interaction, we generated different predicted values 
and their confidence intervals for the same levels of literacy and NGO activity as earlier, holding all 
other variables constant at their mean values (see Table 6).  We conducted the exercise for the 
presidential race.  When literacy is held constant at its highest value, we find a small 1 percentage 
point decrease as NGO activity ranges from the 5th percentile to the 95th percentile.  At the mean 
level of literacy, voting for the left increases just over 2 percentage points as NGO activity ranges 
from the 5th to 95th percentile of the distribution.  At the minimum level of literacy, our model 
predicts that when NGO activity is at the 5% level, 51.3 percent of the population will vote left 
(95% confidence interval; 48.28, 53.61).  When NGO activity is increased to the 95% level, the 
model predicts a substantial increase to 58.80 percent (95% confidence interval; 55.15, 62.45).  At 
the lowest level of literacy, when increasing NGO activity from the 5-95 percent level, there is a 7.5 
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percentage point increase in support for the PT.  This is a significant change since the margin of 
victory for most mayoral races is 3 to 5 percentage points.
Tables 4-6 about here
DISCUSSION
The results imply that NGOs are better at politics than they are at increasing social capital and civil 
society.  While this is certainly a possibility, there are several limitations which militate against 
drawing such a bold conclusion.  First, the inferences we draw are constrained by context: our data 
analysis is based on a specific time and place that may be unique (the Brazilian elections of  2006).  It 
would be tempting to claim that this was a peculiar election in that Lula, the PT’s incumbent 
presidential candidate, did well among poorer voters in rural areas than in the previous race, 
generating our results on literacy, NGO activity, and the PT.  It is important to remember, however, 
that we found similar results over a wide range of  races and candidates.  Although our results could 
be dependent on the Brazilian context, they don’t seem to be dependent on Lula’s candidacy.  
 Second, the kinds of  NGOs captured in our variable of  interest are extremely 
heterogeneous.  To expect a sports club to function the same as an organization designed to educate 
citizens in their economic and political rights is problematic.  While disaggregating NGOs into 
different kinds or classifications will provide more refined conclusions, that we found some strong 
empirical patterns at this level of  aggregation suggests the effect is important.  Additional insights 
and claims, however, can be generated by disaggregating NGOs into more coherent and 
theoretically relevant groups.
 Third, there is the problem of  endogeneity.  The number of  NGOs in a community is not 
exogenously determined nor is it assigned randomly.  Without a convincing instrument, we can 
identify some important political patterns but should be modest in any causal claims.  With that in 
mind, we find the success of  the PT (a party associated with a programatic leftist ideology) varies 
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more dramatically as NGO activity increases in relatively uneducated communities.  Where 
education levels are relatively high, there seems to be no association between NGOs and politics.  At 
the same time, there appears to be no substantively significant relationship between NGOs and 
turnout, regardless of  the context.  What explains these contrasting patterns?
 The impact NGOs have on turnout might be constrained by Brazil’s electoral laws: since 
voting is mandatory, there may simply not be enough variation for NGO activity to explain.  
Although there is variation in turnout, the importance of  education, income, and other socio-
economic outcomes overshadow NGOs.  Rather than mobilizing the electorate, NGOs seem to 
have an important relationship with how people vote, particularly in uneducated communities.  
Although not an exhaustive list, two plausible explanations come to mind.  First, let us articulate 
what is a more apolitical view that implies NGOs are neutral arbiters in the political process.  NGOs 
provide individuals with the kind of  organization and communicative space to articulate their desires 
and concerns, affecting political attitudes and orientations.  In that sense, NGOs do increase social 
capital, civil society, and it just so happens in this case to have benefitted the left.  Second, there is a 
more cynical argument.  NGO activity, often associated with services for the poor and the 
environment, is primarily an undertaking populated by individuals sympathetic to more liberal 
causes.  As NGOs proliferate, they provide information and organizational space for those 
sympathetic to their cause.  Consequently, at least in the context of  the Brazilian elections in 2006, 
these organizations were able to influence electoral outcomes in relatively uneducated areas, where 
previous political orientations may be less well formed.  We cannot determine which explanation is 
correct without more data and analysis.  Classifying NGOs further into groups that distinguish 
between political, recreational, and social organizations might help toward this impasse.
CONCLUSION
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The deep divisions in research on NGOs suggest that scholarship should examine macro and 
institutional factors that affect NGO impact on politics. In this paper, we focused on one such 
factor - education. Leveraging newly available data on NGOs in Brazil’s 5,000 plus municipalities, we 
sought to test whether the impact NGOs have on voting turnout and support for the PT varies by 
educational level.  Two broad themes emerge from the models estimated in the preceding section: 1) 
NGOs have a more consequential influence on voting behavior than voting turnout; 2) the 
education level of a community is an important contextual feature of NGOs and their impact on 
politics.  The results imply, most importantly, that NGOs and the educational level of society serve 
as functional equivalents.  In well-educated societies, the impact NGOs have on turnout and voting 
for the PT are relatively small.  In municipalities with relatively low levels of education, NGOs are 
strongly correlated with important changes in the PT’s electoral fortunes.  
 The wider implications of the study are twofold.  First, the results suggest that when context 
is taken into account, NGOs matter politically.  In the 2006 Brazilian Presidential elections, NGOs 
had an important positive effect on Lula’s chances in communities with relatively low levels of 
human capital.  Unless context is taken into account, the relationship between NGOs and politics 
will remain obscured.  Second, NGOs may provide the means through which relatively uneducated 
populations can express their views.  We offer no evidence on whether NGOs influence citizens’ 
views or NGOs function as unbiased avenues through which a disadvantaged populace can express 
its opinion.  What is clear, however, is that in terms of political participation and voting behavior, 
NGOs will have their biggest impact among the least educated. 
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Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics
Variable N Mean SD Min Max
Turnout State Deputy 5556 74.25 6.94 31.18 196.35
Turnout Fed Deputy 5556 74.64 6.63 31.15 195.58
Turnout Senate 5556 125.42 16.36 56.35 353.79
Turnout Governor 5504 72.70 6.41 44.42 90.47
Turnout Presidential 5504 74.43 5.93 45.00 89.67
PT State Deputy 5557 21.53 16.48 0.32 91.53
PT Fed Deputy 5557 30.72 17.32 2.00 95.51
PT Governor 5557 35.05 25.95 0.00 146.23
PT Senate 5557 27.95 23.61 0.00 99.94
PT President 5557 53.64 17.71 14.65 95.10
% Migrants 4973 6.89 5.62 0.02 108.73
NGOs p/c (logged) 5475 0.70 0.73 -3.00 3.35
% Literate 5507 78.23 12.46 39.34 99.09
% Rural 4920 39.65 22.25 0.03 98.44
Gini Coefficient 5507 0.56 0.06 0.36 0.82
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Table 2: Turnout in 2006 Elections Regressed on the number of  NGOs per capita (logged) and 
control variables
State Deputy Federal Deputy Senator Governor President
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
NGOs per thousand (logged) 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.16 0.08
(0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10)
% Literate 0.23*** 0.21*** 0.29*** 0.33*** 0.36***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Population (logged) -1.50*** -1.55*** -1.19*** -1.24*** -1.08***
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07)
Income Per Capita (Thousands) 7.71*** 5.02*** 4.34*** 10.60*** 12.84***
(1.54) (1.40) (1.45) (1.34) (1.30)
% Rural 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
% Migrants -0.07*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.07*** -0.06***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Gini Coefficient -11.26*** -8.38*** -9.87*** -12.99*** -13.91***
(1.37) (1.24) (1.29) (1.19) (1.15)
Constant 85.99*** 88.04*** 72.25*** 73.88*** 71.56***
(2.29) (2.08) (2.16) (1.99) (1.93)
Number of  observations 4,891 4,891 4,891 4,891 4,891
Adjusted R2 0.375 0.352 0.562 0.617 0.583
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All models include state fixed effects
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Table 3: Turnout in 2006 Elections Regressed on the Interaction between the Number of  NGOs per 
capita (logged) and Literacy
State Deputy Federal Deputy Senator Governor President
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
NGOs per thousand (logged) 2.56*** 3.21*** 2.40*** 1.78*** 1.91***
(0.65) (0.59) (0.62) (0.57) (0.55)
NGOs X Literacy -0.03*** -0.04*** -0.03*** -0.02*** -0.02***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
% Literate 0.24*** 0.23*** 0.30*** 0.34*** 0.37***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Population (logged) -1.54*** -1.60*** -1.23*** -1.27*** -1.11***
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07)
Income Per Capita (1,000) 9.19*** 6.89*** 5.72*** 11.58*** 13.94***
(1.58) (1.44) (1.50) (1.38) (1.33)
% Rural 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
% Migrants -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.06*** -0.07*** -0.06***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Gini Coefficient -11.69*** -8.93*** -10.28*** -13.27*** -14.24***
(1.37) (1.24) (1.29) (1.19) (1.15)
Constant 85.58*** 87.53*** 71.87*** 73.62*** 71.26***
(2.29) (2.08) (2.16) (1.99) (1.93)
Number of  observations 4,891 4,891 4,891 4,891 4,891
Adjusted R2 0.377 0.356 0.563 0.618 0.584
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All models include state fixed effects
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Table 4: Percentage of  PT Vote in 2006 Elections Regressed on the number of  NGOs per capita 
(logged) and control variables
State Deputy Federal Deputy Senator Governor President
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
NGOs per thousand (logged) 0.49 0.89** 0.52** 1.35*** 0.95***
(0.38) (0.38) (0.26) (0.27) (0.24)
% Literate 0.13*** 0.17*** 0.13*** 0.09*** -0.08***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Population (logged) 1.33*** 4.16*** 1.88*** 2.28*** 1.44***
(0.27) (0.27) (0.18) (0.19) (0.17)
Income Per Capita (1,000) 3.02 -41.01*** -19.53*** -37.22*** -75.06***
(4.91) (4.95) (3.36) (3.47) (3.14)
% Rural 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.04*** -0.06***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
% Migrants 0.06 0.21*** 0.17*** 0.15*** 0.05*
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Gini Coefficient 4.60 7.58* 9.45*** 17.84*** 18.55***
(4.36) (4.39) (2.98) (3.08) (2.79)
Constant -4.82 -37.08*** 7.93 -34.45*** 28.12***
(7.30) (7.35) (5.00) (5.17) (4.67)
Number of  observations 4,891 4,891 4,891 4,891 4,891
Adjusted R2 0.211 0.277 0.821 0.833 0.721
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All models include state fixed effects
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Table 5: Percentage of  PT Vote in 2006 Elections Regressed on the Interaction between the Number 
of  NGOs per capita (logged) and Literacy
State Deputy Federal Deputy Senator Governor President
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
NGOs per thousand (logged) -1.48 3.96* 3.43** 1.92 5.57***
(2.09) (2.10) (1.43) (1.48) (1.33)
NGOs X Literacy 0.03 -0.04 -0.04** -0.01 -0.06***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
% Literate 0.12*** 0.19*** 0.14*** 0.10*** -0.06**
(0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Population (logged) 1.36*** 4.11*** 1.83*** 2.27*** 1.36***
(0.27) (0.27) (0.19) (0.19) (0.17)
Income Per Capita (1,000) 1.83 -39.16*** -17.78*** -36.88*** -72.28***
(5.07) (5.10) (3.47) (3.58) (3.24)
% Rural 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.04*** -0.06***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
% Migrants 0.06 0.21*** 0.17*** 0.15*** 0.04
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Gini Coefficient 4.95 7.03 8.94*** 17.74*** 17.73***
(4.37) (4.40) (2.99) (3.09) (2.79)
Constant -4.49 -37.59*** 7.45 -34.54*** 27.35***
(7.31) (7.36) (5.00) (5.17) (4.67)
Number of  observations 4,891 4,891 4,891 4,891 4,891
Adjusted R2 0.211 0.278 0.821 0.833 0.721
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All models include state fixed effects
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Table 6: Predicted Values (in grey) and Confidence Intervals (95%) of  PT Vote at the Minimum, 
Median, and Maximum Values of  Literacy by NGOs (selected percentiles)
NGOs 
Literacy
40%
70%
99%
5th 25th 50th 75th 95th
51.27 53.98 55.35 56.57 58.80
48.94 51.52 52.65 53.58 55.15
53.61 56.43 56.43 59.56 62.45
50.44 51.29 51.72 52.10 52.79
48.29 49.13 49.53 49.86 50.44
52.60 53.45 53.91 54.33 55.14
49.87 49.44 49.22 49.03 48.67
46.72 46.59 46.44 46.26 45.80
53.03 52.30 52.01 51.80 51.54
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Appendix I. OLS regression using matched data (PT Presidential Vote 2006)
Coefficients
constant
NGO (treatment 0/1)
Literacy
NGO*Literacy
Income per capita
% of  population in rural areas
% of  population that are migrants
Gini Coefficient
Residual standard error: 11.03 on 3791 degrees of  freedom
Multiple R-squared: 0.5976, Adjusted R-squared: 0.5969
F-statistic: 804.4 on 7 and 3791 DF,  p-value: < 2.2e-16"
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
92.16 3.66 25.17 < 2e-16***
8.06 2.73 2.95 .0032**
-0.49 0.037 -13.1 < 2e-16***
-0.085 0.034 -2.49 0.013*
-81.13 3.63 -22.38 < 2e-16***
-0.1 0.01 -10.49 < 2e-16***
-0.2 0.037 -5.57 2.68e-08***
32.88 3.41 9.64 <2e-16***
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